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Abstract
We discuss the ongoing liberalization process in the market for ad-
dressed letter mail in Switzerland. The core of the paper is an assess-
ment of the liberalization’s impact on the financial viability of various
universal service obligations with and without access to the incumbent’s
downstream delivery network for customers and competitors. We propose
a simple calibrated model of the Swiss letter market offering theoretical
insights into the mechanics of market opening along with quantitative
conclusions bearing direct policy relevance. The extent of the entrants’
market coverage and the equilibrium in the resulting price competition are
endogenously determined. Our simulations suggest caution in introducing
full market opening. For the scenarios considered, the model shows that
either the burden of the uso must be reduced (e.g. with respect to the
frequency and the coverage of delivery and / or through price differenti-
ation). Alternatively, other means of assuring financial stability of Swiss
Post must be sought, be it through external funds or demand stimulation
through new producs, possibly in the worksharing domain.
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1 Introduction
Postal market liberalization is a current issue in Switzerland as well as
in the European Union (eu). In the eu, the market for addressed mail
items has been liberalized down to a reserverd (monopoly) area for letters
weighing less than 50g at the beginning of 2006. Individual countries have
already gone further, e.g. Sweden with full market opening in 1993. eu-
wide full liberalization is envisaged in 2009. In Switzerland, the reserved
area has been reduced to 100g in spring 2006 and a postal legislation revi-
sion is currently under way, potentially comprising further steps towards
full liberalization as well.
The reserved area has been the traditional means to finance the pro-
vision of universal postal services at uniform prices. There is, therefore, a
concern that reductions in the reserved area could undermine the ability
of the incumbent postal operator to finance its universal service obligation
(uso). Due to the lack of experience, there are currently no empirical stud-
ies available concerning the long-run market development after extensive
liberalization.
In this paper we assess the impact of the liberalization of the Swiss
letter market on the viability of uso on the basis of a market entry model.
The paper aims at answering the question posed by Panzar (2001): “What
levels of subsidy, rates, and reserved areas will allow the incumbent to
cover its costs in the coming competitive area?” for the Swiss case.
The question has been tackled before: Hill, Robinson, and Rodriguez
(2001) examine the prospects for a graveyard spiral in the uk and focus
on scenarios in which the uso remains unchanged. Key in their analysis
are the extent and implications of entry. Based on a calibrated model,
Crew and Kleindorfer (2001) find that entry is likely to reduce efficiency
and financing problems for the incumbent operator are likely to become
significant. In their prospective study on behalf of the European Commis-
sion, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006a) find that under full market open-
ing (fmo) the uso needs to be changed significantly (“adapted to market
conditions”) in order to be financially sustainable.1 The report prepared
by Oxera (2007) discusses various mechanisms that could be used to fund
uso provision.
The foremost motivation for market opening in the eu is the accom-
plishment of the postal internal market, while Switzerland primarily aims
at finding an efficient means to provide a high level of universal service
obligations. Dietl et al. (2005) develop a model of the Swiss letter
market with a focus on regulatory scenarios. We propose a simple cali-
brated model of the Swiss letter market offering theoretical insights into
the mechanics of market opening along with quantitative conclusions bear-
ing direct policy relevance. The model allows for a continuum of market
opening and -entry and uso scenarios. Moreover, we are able to quantita-
tively compare equilibria with and without mandated downstream access
provided to entrants at regulated rates based on avoided cost.
1Cf. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006a), p.23: “We use the term ‘adapting the uso to
market conditions’ to mean generally achieving a better alignment of price, cost and value for
uso services. This might include, for example, using postal employees to provide services in
rural areas as part of their routes rather than at fixed counters, increased use of franchised
operations, increasing the stamp price, and eliminating uniformity requirements on business-
originated mail. Adapting the uso could also mean changing the constraints on accessibility
for counters and collection services as populations and demand for postal services change over
time.”
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives an outline of the model.
Section 3 introduces technology, consumer preferences, and the uso in
place. Section 4 discusses price competition and establishes the com-
petitive equilibrium, while in section 5 we discuss the entrant’s market
coverage decision. We calibrate the model in section 6. In section 7 we
quantitatively assess various scenarios with respect to market opening,
uso and the access regime. Section 8 gives a sensitivity analysis with
respect to crucial parameter; section 9 concludes.
2 Model Outline
The model addresses the entry game in the postal market. There is a
regulatory authority setting the incumbent’s uso and the degree of market
openness. The incumbent faces prescribed behavior in her product choice
and pricing behavior. Entrants choose the scope of their entry and their
conduct in price competition. For simplicity, we pool all entrants in a
single representative one who is – due to implicit or explicit collusion –
able to charge a markup over marginal cost.2 Note that in our model we
assume the discrete entry decision of operators other than the incumbent
as exogenously given. We are therefore not interested in the absolute
values of the entrant’s profit, but only in the profit maximizing pricing and
market coverage. It will be interesting, however, to compare the entrant’s
profit under various scenarios in order to assess her relative incentive to
enter into the market in the first place.
The uso is exogenously defined, which currently amounts to full mar-
ket coverage and daily delivery for the incumbent Swiss Post as well as
uniform prices. The sequence of endogenous decisions by the involved
actors in the model is then as follows: Anticipating the equilibrium in the
resulting price competition, first, entrants decide on their market cover-
age with either own delivery or – if available – downstream access to the
incumbent’s delivery network. Second, there is price competition in the
competitive market segments with consumers deciding on the quantity of
letters to send with each provider.
1
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Market entry → rE ;
Competitive price setting → pE .
Figure 1: Timeline of the entrant’s decisions in postal competition.
In the formal description of the model below, subscripts denote partial
derivatives; capital subscript E indicates the association of a variable with
the entrant. Subscript M is the incumbent acting as a monopolist, while
subscript C denotes the incumbent in competition. Variables which are
calibrated according to currrent values are denoted by a hat. In order
to find a subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the model backwards,
starting with an analysis of postal production and consumer demand.
2This is counter to the “competitive fringe” assumption usually made in the literature.
However, e.g. in the Swiss market for the conveyance of unaddressed mail, such behavior is
common in practice. Moreover, allowing the entrant to make a profit in the model permits an
assessment of market attractivity to potential entrants when the market is being opened.
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3 Technology, Consumer Preferences, and
Universal Service Obligations
The single most important constraing facing the incumbent postal oper-
ator is the explicit uso it has to satisfy. Concerning the Swiss market
for addressed mail, it currently consists of regulations in the following
dimensions:
• Product Range List of services has to be approved by the min-
istry of transportation;
• Covered Area Distribution must be ubiquitous; the next postal
counter network must be located within resonable distance;3
• Frequency of Service Collection and delivery must take place
every working day, at least five times per week;
• Prices Prices must be uniform in reserved area and non-discriminatory
for universal service;
• Quality At least 97% of all mail must be delivered in E+1 / E+3.
This value has been surpassed regularly by Swiss Post.
When assessing liberalization scenarios we also discuss the financial im-
pact of a slackening of these obligations. Technology and the uso deter-
mine the cost of mail conveyance. It is the sum of4
(a) quantity-dependent cost,
(b) coverage- and delivery-frequency-dependent cost and
(c) independent (fixed) cost.
In the model, we have cost consisting of a fixed amount f , variable cost
κq which is linear in quantity q, and quantity-independent time cost grβ
which is a function of the served partial market as measured in the frac-
tion r of served households. Delivery cost is convex in market coverage
(β > 1) which reflects high time cost of delivery in rural areas with low
population density. Total cost is thus given by
c(q, r) = κq + grβ + f. (1)
Variable g ≡ αhλ depends on the frequency of delivery h which is an
important determinant of quality, where parameter 0 < λ < 1 determines
the convexity of the cost function with respect to the delivery frequency.
Currently, the Swiss Post’s uso requires delivery on five days per week
which normalizes hˆ = 1. Senders gain utility from the quantity of letters
sent q and a nume´raire good z and dispose of a budget y. For simplicity,
we assume that mail demand treats letters of different weight and size as
homogeneous. When discussing market opening by letter category below,
we simply assume that different portions of a homogeneous market are
being opened. Maximizing utility by
max
q,z
V (q, z) = δ−
1
γ
q
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
+ z s.t. pq + z ≤ y (2)
by means of the Lagrangean
L = δ−
1
γ
q
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
+ z − µ(pq + z − y) (3)
3PostReg, the Swiss regulatory authority, considers this to mean that 90% of the population
must be able to reach the next post office within 20 minutes.
4Cf. table 1 in section 6 below.
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yields iso-elastic demand
q(p) = δpγ (4)
with price elasticity γ.
Figure 2 displays the two dimensions of the postal market: The hor-
izontal dimension is the letter type dimension, while the vertical dimen-
sion has the two interpretations of the geographical location of delivery or
sender type. While the first dimension is useful to define market opening,
the second determines the structure of the cost function and area cover-
age of delivery if it is endogenously determined.5 The figure shows market
segmentation after (partial) market opening. The uso currently in place
implies full market coverage in both dimensions by the incumbent. The
entrant’s market coverage is pictured by the shaded area in the figure.
This is the market segment under competition. It is limited by the de-
gree of market opening m and her own choice of coverage r. The rest is
monpolistic, i.e. the entrant is either not able or not willing to serve that
market.
0 m
r
1
1
Figure 2: Market dimensions: geographical/consumer type (r) and letter
type (m) dimension.
4 Price Competition
After market entry, the entrant and the incumbent compete in linear and
uniform tariffs.6 The incumbent’s cost function is given as in (1), while
the entrant has costs
cE(qE , rE) = υqE + ωr
β
E + fE . (5)
In analogy to g, ω < g depends on chosen delivery frequency. υ ist the
entrant’s marginal cost with respect to quantity. Individual demand to
the incumbent consists of quantity demanded in the monopolized part of
the market plus her demand in the competitive segment
q(pM , pC , pE, rE) = qM (pM) + qC(pC , pE). (6)
In the monopoly segment, the incumbent faces demand
qM (pM , rE) = (1−mrE) δp
γ
M . (7)
5Our approach is similar to the one employed by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002).
6The distinction of a monopolistic and a competitive market segment below allows the
incumbent to discriminate prices between these segments in principle. In parts of the simula-
tions, however, we will assume a regulatory freeze of all prices, such that price uniformity is
maintained.
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The monopoly segment’s borders are defined by the degree of market
opening m and the entrant’s choice of market coverage rE . This formula-
tion implies that total market demand depends on the incumbent’s price
only. This is a justifiable simplification as long as the incumbent remains
the dominant player in the market.7
In the complementary part of the entire market, the incumbent faces
demand
qC(pC , pE, rE) = mrEsδp
γ
C, (8)
where market share s is given by
s =


0 pE ≤ 0,(
pE
pC
)χ
0 ≤ pE ≤ pC ,
1 pE ≥ pC .
(9)
The constant switching elasticity in the competitive market segments
is εs:pE = −εs:pC = χ > 0. Note that this formulation of the switch-
ing function yields isoelastic individual demand functions. It gives the
incumbent the advantage that she serves the whole market if prices are
equal; the entrant is able to gain market share only by undercutting the
incumbent’s price.8 Hence, the price elasticity of the incumbent’s demand
is εq:pC = γ − χ c.p. Figure 3 illustrates the incumbent’s market share as
a function of the entrant’s relative price.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
00.20.40.60.81
χ = 0.2
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χ = 5.0
Figure 3: Incumbent market share as a function of the entrant’s relative
price.
In the served market, the entrant faces demand
qE(pC , pE, rE) = mrE(1− s)δp
γ
C. (10)
In the simulations below, we will assume tight incumbent price regulation,
such that in fact only the entrant is able to freely choose her price: The
incumbent’s monopoly and competitive prices pM and pC are exogenously
set by the regulation authority. Given these prices, the entrant sets her
optimum price pE. Arguing backwards, the entrant’s program is regular
and
max
pE
piE = pEqE(pC , pE, rE)− cE(qE(pC , pE, rE), rE) (11)
7This assumption implies that competition does not stimulate total demand. It ignores
the empirically established fact that the products of the universal service provider and the
entrants are imperfect substitutes, such that competition indeed affects total demand (cf.
Pearsall, 2005).
8This is a common assumption in the literature, cf. e.g. the prospective eu study by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006a).
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with the first-order condition being
1 = (χ+ 1)pχEp
−χ
C − υχp
χ−1
E p
−χ
C . (12)
There is no closed-form solution to (12). Note, however, that in the
case pC = υ it yields pE = pC . Total differentiation then yields
dpE
dpC
=
(χ+ 1)χ pE
pC
− χ2 υ
pC
(χ+ 1)χ− (χ− 1)χ υ
pE
, (13)
such that
0 ≤
dpE
dpC
∣∣∣∣
pE≥pC
≤ 1. (14)
Hence, the first-order condition satisfies the entrant’s non-negative profit
condition whenever she serves a positive market share. Figure 4 illustrates
numerical solutions for different values of the entrant’s marginal cost υ.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
pC
υ = 0.3
υ = 0
Figure 4: Entrant’s price (dashed lines) given the incumbent’s (υ ∈
{0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3}).
Hence, whatever the incumbent’s price, the entrant will almost lin-
early underprice it as long as her price exceeds marginal cost.9 These
considerations complete the characterization of the second step in the de-
cision timeline. The equilibrium in price competition is the basis for the
entrant’s entry decision.
5 Market Entry
In this section, we study market entry first without and then with the
availability of downstream access to delivery.
9In the special case of υ = 0, i.e. if the entrant has zero quantity-dependent marginal cost,
we have
pE = pC
(
1
χ+ 1
) 1
χ
. (15)
The assumption of zero quantity-dependent marginal cost is reasonable as long as the entrant
does not operate at her capacity limit. The business case of CityMail in Sweden, who conveys
only electronically processed mail, suggests that, indeed, an entrant bears very little quantity-
dependent cost which then mainly consists of the delivery cost related to the number of
served households. Cf. wik Consult (2006) for a discussion of postal business models in
various countries of the European Union.
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5.1 Downstream Bypass
Without access, the entrant has the choice of market coverage
max
rE∈[0,1]
piE = pEqE(pC , pE, rE)− cE(qE(pC , pE, rE), rE). (16)
Exploiting the first-order condition yields
rE =
[
mδpγCpE
(
1−
(
pE
pC
)χ)
βω
] 1
β−1
(17)
=

mδ ( γ−χ1+γ−χκ)1+γ ( 11+χ) 1χ (1− 11+χ)
βω


1
β−1
.
Comparative statics yield that the covered area by the entrant increases
in the degree of market opening, ∂rE/∂m > 0, while its reaction to the de-
gree of substitutability between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s postal
service is ambiguous, ∂rE/∂χ <> 0.
5.2 Worksharing
Under worksharing, the regulatory setting comprises the area-independent
per-piece worksharing discount the entrant pays to the incumbent. This
defines the access charge pA. Since access is assumed to be area-independent,
the entrant chooses full coverage access and offers full coverage to her cus-
tomer. Compared to downstream bypass, worksharing with access induces
the entrant to increase her offer with respect to delivery coverage while
at the same time waiving the cost of establishing a parallel delivery net-
work. She hence bears only the upstream marginal cost κ− κD and zero
coverage- and delivery-frequency-dependent cost.
5.3 Welfare
Total welfare is computed as the sum of all operator profits plus the
consumers’ net utility
W = pi + piE + V (qM + qC + qE)− qMpM − qCqM − qEpE − T, (18)
where T is a lump-sum transfer from consumers to the incumbent postal
operator (cf. the receiver-pays-principle scenario below). In the simu-
lations we assume for simplicity that reductions in the uso are welfare
neutral, i.e. that the cost saving by the incumbent is just offset by the
increased costs on the receivers’ side.10
6 Calibration
In Switzerland, total cost of addressed mail conveyance amonts to 1950m
chf. With a total revenue of 2150m chf, the resulting profit is roughly
10In the rpp case, the incumbent’s profit function becomes pi = pMqM + pCqC − c+ T .
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200m chf.11 Swiss Post’s total cost of addressed mail conveyance con-
sists of (a) quantity-dependent cost, (b) coverage- and delivery-frequency-
dependent cost and (c) independent (fixed) cost. Table 1 gives the cost
structure in two dimensions: supply chain and cost type.
Table 1: Cost structure of addressed mail conveyance in Switzerland.
Supply chain Cost type
Collection 15% (a) 40%
Processing 24% (b) 16%
Delivery 55% (c) 44%
Overhead 6%
Total 100% 100%
Note: Data from 2005 in chf.
A calibration for Switzerland with data from 2005 yields parameter
values as stated in table 2.12 Parameter δˆ is computed from (4); κˆ follows
from table 1 and qˆ. The chosen value of γ = −0.3 is in line with existing
literature.13 We consciously choose a value from the low end in the range
proposed by the empirical literature. In the simulations below, this will
lead to conservative results concerning the effect of market opening on
the necessary price increase in order for Swiss Post to break even. Pa-
rameters β and γ determine the convexity of the cost function and are
calibrated to fit with data from Swiss Post. Due to the existing uso, the
Swiss Post’s coverage is exogenously set to its maximum level which is
normalized to unity, r = 1. Note that due to current price regulation in
Switzerland, the actual price pˆ = 0.766 is well below its profit maximizing
level: Inelastic demand is not compatible with monopoly pricing, since
a monopolist would optimally increase price beyond the point where de-
mand becomes elastic. Hence, our choice of isoelastic demand is not well
suited to describe the current monopoly, but in competition, demand may
well be price elastic.
Table 2: Status quo calibration with Swiss data from 2005.
Input data Calibrated value
qˆ = 2810m β = 6
pˆ = 0.766 chf γ = -0.3
δˆ = 2594m λ = 0.5
κˆ = 0.27 chf
11Current legislation imposes the burden of the uso on addressed mail. The data given
correspond to a suppositional more balanced allocation of costs in which all products take an
adequate share.
12Considered mail categories are addressed proirity and economy mail (corresponding to A,
B1, and B2 mail in Switzerland).
13In an empirical study for Switzerland, Trinkner and Grossmann (2006) find a long-run
price elasticity between -0.22 and -0.27. From his survey of studies, Robinson (2007) concludes
that price elasticity measures for mail products typically range between -0.2 and -0.8 (Cf. also
Fe`ve et al., 2006, for a recent study on mail price elasticities). In a similar exercise as ours,
D’Alcantara and Amerlynck (2006) choose a value of -0.3; Dietl et al. (2005) use values
between -0.3 and -0.4.
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Table 3 summarizes the chosen calibration of the consumers’ switching
function and the incumbent’s and entrant’s cost parameters. By setting
υ = 0.18 we assume the entrant’s marginal cost advantage to amount to
roughly 33%. This corresponds to the actual wage differential between
Swiss Post and private competitors in the already liberalized markets for
delivery of unaddressed mail and newspapers. The choice of ω amounts
to assuming that with an optimal delivery frequency choice, the entrant
incurs 50% of the incumbent’s time cost, c.p. Note that the chosen value of
the entrant’s fixed cost is independent of her choice of market penetration.
This is of course unrealisitic, but it nevertheless allows for a comparison of
scenarios with the same degree of market openness. The calibration of the
switching elasticity is decisive for the simulation outcomes. The choice of
χ = 1.2 corresponds to the model calibrations in PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(2006a) and D’Alcantara and Amerlynck (2006).
Table 3: Calibration of switching and cost parameters in competition.
Incumbent Competitor
gˆ = 300m chf ω = 150m chf
κ = 0.27 υ = 0.18
κD = 0.19 υD = 0.13
f = 1’000m chf fE = 200m chf
χ = 1.20
According to table 3, we set the incumbent’s marginal delivery cost
to κD = 0.19.14 This is the cost the incumbent bears per unit in the
downstream access channel. In the simulations with downstream access,
we set the access price pA = 0.64 chf which corresponds to a worksharing
discount equal to avoided cost. In order to assess the sensitivity of our
results with respect to the implied marginal delivery cost, we ran a number
of scenarios on alternative cost structures (cf. section 8 below).
7 Scenario Analysis
In this section we discuss various market opening scenarios with respect
to their effect on the incumbent’s market share and profitability. Note
that the model presented in the previous section discusses equilibrium
effects only. Hence, the analysis does not permit statements on the short-
term effects of liberalization.15 Before actually calculating the effect of
various liberalization scenarios on the financing of the uso, we have to
define relevant scenarios in terms of the market opening parameters in our
model. The values given in table 4 correspond to the actual composition
of total addressed mail in Switzerland in 2005 (e.g. 56% of total addressed
mail volume weighs less than 20g).
In the following we simulate five market opening scenarios. The basis
is the status quo in the Swiss market for addressed mail: A monopoly
(m = 0) with full market coverage obligation (r = 1) and a uniform price.
14This value corresponds to the result by Farsi, Filippini, and Trinkner (2006) who estimate
the determinants of delivery cost in the Swiss mail market.
15wik Consult (2006) show that the rate of market share loss of the incument postal oper-
ators in Europe is approximately 1% p.a. of the opened market segment.
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Table 4: Parametrization of market opening scenarios.
monopoly level market opening
100g m = 0.15
50g m = 0.30
20g m = 0.56
0g m = 1.00
1. Partial market opening with a monopoly level at 50g and a freeze of
the incumbent’s prices;
2. Full market opening (fmo) with a monopoly level at 0g and a freeze
of the incumbent’s prices;
3. As scenario 2 with a reduction in the uso in the form of 5 delivery
days, and 90% area coverage;
4. Full market opening with a break-even constraint on the incumbent
and differentiated but uniform prices within the monopolistic and
competitive market segments;
5. As scenario 4 with the possibility to raise a flat delivery rate (receiver-
pays-principle, rpp);
6. Worksharing with a monopoly, mandated downstream access, and a
freeze of the incumbent’s prices.
Table 5 summarizes the simulation results of market opening with
respect to market entry, the resulting equilibrium prices, and the impact
on profits and employment; a discussion follows below.
7.1 Price Freeze
This section considers scenarios in which the incumbent’s prices in monopoly
and the competitive sectors are kept constant. The answered question is
thus: “How is the incumbent’s profit affected under various uso and mar-
ket opening scenarios?” Column 2 in table 5 summarizes the effect of full
market opening to the incumbent’s delivery network. With the current
uso in place, the incumbent Swiss Post would end up with a total market
share of 0.6, incurring a loss of almost 550m chf compared to the result
with full monopoly. If the market is only partially opened (e.g. only for
letters weighing more than 50g), the effects remain the same with the only
difference that now the incumbent operator is able to make a profit, while
market entry is unlikely due to the entrant’s expected loss in equilibrium.
Column 1 in table 5 shows these results.
Considering total welfare as defined in (18), there are two effects re-
lated to market opening: Lower prices increase welfare, while the dupli-
cation of fixed costs is detrimental.
As to the financial viability of the uso, column 3 in table 5 shows the
effect of a reduction in its burden: A decrease from 6 to 5 delivery days
and only 90% area coverage may limit Swiss Post’s loss, while not greatly
affecting the market outcome otherwise.
7.2 Profit (Break-Even) Regulation
In contrast to the above section, we now simulate scenarios keeping the
incumbent’s profit constant. We thus answer the question: “What price
11
Table 5: The impact of market opening on the incumbent operator.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6
Monopoly price 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 –
Competitive price 0.77 0.77 0.77 1.16 0.66 0.77
Entrant Price 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.68 0.43 0.70
Access Price – – – – – 0.58
Entrant coverage 0.72 0.92 0.92 0.98 0.89 –
Entrant profit -142.70 43.00 43.00 243.32 -10.24 -178.63
Inc. quantity 2549.95 1707.18 1707.18 1352.71 1844.66 2506.21
Inc. market sharea 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.89
Inc. market shareb 0.91 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.63 0.89
∆ inc. profit -128.98 -547.00 -392.02 -200.00 -200.00 -33.42
Inc. employment‡ -0.04 -0.15 -0.23 -0.20 -0.13 -0.01
Mail volume‡ 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.00
Welfare‡ -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.06
Notes: Labor cost is a constant fraction of total cost; quantity and profits is
in m units; ‡ means changes relative to status quo. Incumbent upstream market
share is a in competitive market segment and b overall. Scenarios are:
Column 1: partial market opening (monopoly level at 50g) with price freeze;
Column 2: full market opening (fmo, monopoly level at 0g) with price freeze;
Column 3: fmo with price freeze, 5 delivery days, and 90% coverage;
Column 4: fmo with break-even constraint;
Column 5: fmo with break-even constraint and rpp;
Column 6: monopoly with mandated downstream access and price freeze.
increase is needed to let the incumbent attain a certain profit under various
uso and market opening scenarios?” We confine our scenario simulations
to equilibiria in which the incumbent just breaks even.
Column 4 in table 5 summarizes the effect of fmo and a break-even
constraint on the incumbent’s side. Compared to the according scenario
without break-even, prices are now significantly higher, leading also to an
increased market coverage and profit by the entrant.
Recent steps in the liberalization of the postal sector force policy mak-
ers to find a broader financial basis for postal services. The existence of a
receiver externality, the benefits enjoyed by the receiver of a postal item,
implies that also they should or could contribute to the financing of deliv-
ery costs. This gives rise to the receiver-pays-principle (rpp). Felisberto
et al. (2006) and Friedli et al. (2006) argue that the introduction of
a delivery flat rate (dfr) allows to segment the receiver base into those
who accept low service levels with delivery only to the nearest post of-
fice and those who are willing to pay for taylor-made delivery, typically
to the doorstep. Compared to the high-level universal service obliga-
tion currently in place, this reduces the proportion of overserved receivers
and hence gives rise to a more efficient postal delivery system.16 In our
simulations, we confine ourselves to the same system as public tv and
radio broadcasting are financed in many countries: The introduction of
16Jaag (2007) and Jaag and Trinkner (2008) point at the opportunities and limits of charging
receivers for postal services.
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a compulsory flat postal licence on all households receiving postal mail
items. If receivers are to pay a fixed fee for doorstep delivery this con-
stitutes a lump sum transfer to the postal operator. With 3.5m receiving
households and firms, a monthly fee of 10 chf would – in the case of full
delivery coverage – amount to 420m chf per year which could be passed
on the sending customers. The results of the corresponding simulations
are given in column 5 of table 5. Even with full liberalization, average
price could be lowered to 0.66 chf in the competitive market segments.
The reduction in the overall price level would squeeze down the entrant’s
profit, rendering market entry considerably less attractive.
7.3 Worksharing
Under worksharing, the market for upstream services and consolidation
are open completely to competitors, but final delivery is reserved to the
incumbent Swiss Post. This regulatory framework is essentially the one
currently in place in the usa.17 Column 6 in table 5 summarizes the equi-
librium effects of the worksharing scenarios under price regulation with a
freeze of the incumbent’s prices. Due to mandatory access, the entrant
faces higher marginal costs than with a proprietary delivery network. This
results in a higher price and lower market share and profit. However, the
retention of the downstream monopoly allows the incument to cover her
fixed costs du to large volumes.
From a welfare point of view, among fmo scenarios, worksharing per-
forms well since it avoids the multiplication of fixed costs. Being an ideal
regulatory scheme for the letter market in Switzerland, it bears the risk
of serving as a mere stage in the process to full liberalization: Complete
market opening along with regulated access would challenge the financing
of universal service even more than liberalization without bypass access.
This is due to the ample cherry picking opportunities entrants would have
in such a system.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we report the sensitivity of our simulation results with
respect to crucial parameter choices. Table 6 shows the impact of the
senders’ switching elasticitiy and the entrant’s marginal cost of mail pro-
cessing on the incumbent usp’s market share in the competitive market
segment. As one would expect, a high switching elasticity reduces the
incumbent’s market share considerably. Low marginal cost allows the
entrant to underprice the incumbent, also resulting in a low incumbent
market share. This second effect is due to the asymptotically linear un-
derpricing discussed in the context of figure 4.
Table 7 reports simulation results with different marginal delivery costs
and hence access prices which are computed based on avoided cost. We as-
sume that total marginal cost stays constant and freeze of the incumbent
usp’s competitive price. High delivery cost directly translates into a high
worksharing discount. This allows the entrant to set a low price. Accord-
ingly, the incumbent’s market share is the lower, the higher her marginal
delivery cost. Social welfare is not directly affected by higher marginal de-
livery cost since total marginal cost is assumed constant. However, since
the entrant bears lower cost than the incumbent, a high entrant market
17Cf. Haldi and Olson (2003) for a description of the us worksharing system.
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Table 6: Sensitivity of the incumbent’s market share in the competitive market
segment with respect to the switching elasticity and the entrant’s marginal cost
in scenario 1.
χ→ 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.200 1.400 1.600
υ ↓
0.09 0.682 0.165 0.559 0.512 0.472 0.438
0.12 0.700 0.634 0.578 0.531 0.491 0.456
0.15 0.717 0.652 0.598 0.551 0.511 0.476
0.18 0.733 0.671 0.617 0.571 0.531 0.496
0.21 0.750 0.689 0.637 0.592 0.552 0.516
share means that a large mail volume is more efficiently processed. Hence,
welfare increases in the incumbent’s marginal delivery cost.
Table 7: Sensitivity of the worksharing scenario 6 with respect to the incum-
bent’s marginal delivery cost κD. The worksharing discount is based on avoided
cost.
Scenario 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f
κD 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.190 0.200 0.210
Competitive price 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.766
Entrant Price 0.711 0.706 0.701 0.696 0.691 0.686
Access Price 0.606 0.596 0.586 0.576 0.566 0.556
Inc. market share 0.915 0.907 0.900 0.892 0.884 0.877
Welfare‡ -0.065 -0.063 -0.061 -0.059 -0.057 -0.055
Note: ‡ indicates change relative to the status quo.
Our sensitivity analysis indicates that the choice of crucial parame-
ters significantly influences the simulation outcomes. Hence, quantitiave
results have to be taken with a pinch of salt. When discussing scenarios
concerning further liberalization in the market for addressed mail, it is
crucial to understand its various effects on competition and its outcome.
9 Conclusion
Following the postal liberalization process in the European Union, Switzer-
land intends to further open its postal markets in the years to come, albeit
for different reasons. While one of the main reasons for liberalization in the
eu is the accomplishment of the postal internal market, Switzerland aims
at finding an efficient means to provide a high level of universal service
obligations. It turns out that market opening indeed invites competition,
but challenges the uso currently in place. Its financing is questioned by
the loss of revenues and scale economies in combination with the unifor-
mity and affordability constraints on pricing.
Concerning overall welfare implications of liberalization, the simula-
tions reported here yield robustly negative results. Cost differentials in
the delivery function between the incumbent operator and entrants, and
the associated efficency gains, are captured in our model. The model
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does not reflect, however, welfare gains that might result from entrants’
products being imprefect substitutes for the incumbent’s product. These
effects of product innovation are primarily in the worksharing domain:
Changes in product mix and welfare related to delivery options under
full liberalization are generally considered less important than upstream
benefits of worksharing.18
Competition could certainly stimulate restructuring and internal effi-
ciency gains, as discussed in PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006a). It is ev-
idently a strong belief in this possibility by policy makers which is at
the core of the motivation for current postal liberalization. These effects
are not accounted for in our model. However, PriceWaterhouseCoopers
(2006b) point out that in international comparison, there is a very high
level of implicit and explicit requirements of the existing uso in Switzer-
land. Moreover, there is a strong public support for continuing the uso
at its current level. This represents a significant barrier in adapting Swiss
Post and the uso to competitive market conditions. Therefore, there
are significant risks associated with liberalization. Caution in the speed
and scope of lieralization seems to be the prudent approach, at least for
Switzerland.
The model presented is only a stylized representation of the Swiss
Market and its opening. However, it does seem to represent sufficient
detail on the interaction between the incumbent postal operator and en-
trants to support the following conclusions. For the scenarios considered,
it shows that either the burden of the uso must be reduced (e.g. with
respect to the frequency and the coverage of delivery or as a last resort
through price differentiation). Alternatively, other means of assuring fi-
nancial stability of Swiss Post must be sought, be it through external funds
or demand stimulation through new producs, possibly in the worksharing
domain. Worksharing, i.e a downstream monopoly with an open market
for upstream services and consolidation, could be an efficient means of
promoting competition and stimulating demand while at the same time
ensuring the financial viability of the high level of Swiss universal service
obligations currently in place.
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